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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
LONNIE FERRIS LAWSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 19106 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The defendant, Lonnie Ferris Lawson, was convicted by 
a verdict before Judge James s. Sawaya of criminal homicide, a 
third degree felony, and also convicted of driving under the 
influence of alcohol causing bodily injury, a class A 
misdeamor. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before Judge James s. Sawaya and a 
jury found appellant guilty of automobile homicide and also, 
driving under the influence of alcohol causing bodily injury. 
Appellant was later sentenced. The trial court granted a stay 
of execution for two years conditioned on (1) defendant serve 
one year in the Salt Lake County Jail; (2) retain jurisdiction; 
(3) the defendant was to pay restitution as recommended by 
Adult Probation and Parole; (4) to also maintain full-time 
employment after release from jail; (5) defendant participate 
in and complete any rehabilitation program prescribed by Adult 
Probation and Parole; (6) to consume no alcohol and avoid 
places where alcohol is soldi and (7) to take antebuse if 
needed for his rehabilitation. 
The one-year county jail sentence for driving under 
the influence of alcohol causing bodily injury ran concurrently 
with the criminal homicide sentence. The Trial Judge granted a 
stay of execution for two years and placed defendant on 
probation under the same conditions as the ones for Count I, 
criminal homicide. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming the 
jury verdict as being reasonable under the circumstances. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Witness Clinton Hepner testified (T. 2-35) that on 
October 8, 1982, he picked up his girl friend, Kelly Kehler, in 
his brother's 280Z Datsun. He testified that during the 
evening he had trouble starting his car, in fact, having to 
jump start and/or push start it on several occasions. Hepner 
stated that he purchased gasoline thinking that water in the 
tank might be the problem and that more gas would correct this 
problem. (T. 15) The night was clear and dry. 
Hepner drove toward Sandy City on I-15, but was 
forced to exit the freeway at 3300 South when the Datsun's 
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engine stalled. He signaled and pulled into the emergency lane 
(T. 16) and brought the car to a stop. He saw the brake lights 
and tail lights were working (T. 9, 13). It was a two-lane 
exit (T. 32, also exhibit 27, T. 256, 257). He testified that 
his headlights were working but he turned them off and turned 
on the emergency flashers five to ten seconds before coming to 
a stop. 
Orville Peterson testified (T. 35) that on October 8, 
1982, as he was driving south on the freeway at about 2000 
south, he noticed a Blazer pass him on the left. Peterson 
stated he was going about 50 M.P.H. but accellerated until 
within 150 yards of the Blazer and followed at that distance 
until the Blazer exited at 3300 south. Peterson testified he 
saw a cloud of dust -after the Blazer exited and saw the Blazer 
roll and later saw it upside down (T. 39, 40). He stopped just 
north of the Blazer and walked up to it to assist. Peterson 
looked into the vehicle and saw the driver and he watched as 
the driver exited the Blazer (T. 43, 47, 50). The driver was 
talking or calling names, which gave Peterson the impression 
that someone else may have been thrown out, but no other person 
was found. A passer-by, Jay Bringhurst, testified that he saw 
the male individual lying on the roof inside the Blazer (T. 64, 
67, 72). He also testified that he detected the odor of 
alcohol. Mr. Bringhurst also saw the male individual trying to 
-3-
exit the Blazer (T. 54). He stated that he did not see anyone 
else inside the Blazer. Several witnesses, including a Salt 
Lake City Police Officer, were there almost immediately and 
found no one thrown from the Blazer (T. 43). Peterson 
testified that the occupant of the Blazer was standing there 
with the troopers. 
Trooper Tom Kalma did an investigation and determined 
the point of impact and testified that "there were two distinct 
gouges on the emergency lane itself" (T. 335), which were 
parallel and of equal distance (T. 342-343) that were made by 
the Blazer. He not only identified and reconstructed the 
accident from the exhibits consisting of pictures and diagrams, 
but also visited the scene of the accident (T. 53). For an 
illustration of the-gouge marks see Exhibit 33 (T. 378). 
Accident reconstruction specialist Newell Knight also testified 
and stated "very simply, from the photographs and the gouges on 
the road, the appellant hit the parked Datsun in the emergency 
lane" (T. 408, 414, 419). Mr. Peterson then saw the Datsun 
down by a gully near the fence, right side up and facing north. 
He testified that two people were in the Datsun, that the 
Datsun was smashed and he couldn't open any doors (T. 46). 
Jay Bringhurst, a driver who stopped to render aid, 
and Vern Olsen, a police officer, both testified as to the two 
occupants of the Datsun. Both of them, as well as Peterson, 
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testified that the passenger, a female, was laying across into 
the driver's area. Two paramedics testified to the same fact. 
Dr. Robert Hood testified that he is a qualified 
neuro-surgeon. He further testified that on October 9, 1982, 
at about 12:45 a.rn. he examined two patients who had been 
involved in the same traffic accident. His examination of the 
female passenger showed irregular, shallow breathing and lack 
of response to stimuli. Dr. Hood testified that she was in an 
extremely deep coma (T, 79), and he diagnosed massive head 
injuries based upon neurogenic pulmonary oderna. 
Since there was little or no visible injury (T. 84), 
Dr. Hood concluded that the patient suffered injury to the 
nerve cells in the brain and the brain stern, the lower part of 
the brain that connacts to the spinal cord. He further 
concluded that the patient had suffered forcible movement 
caused by some shearing force as a result of a sudden 
deceleration. He stated that death could have been caused by 
destruction of the medulla from trauma to the head. The CAT 
scan and neurological examination showed massive trauma to the 
brain causing brain contusion and injury (T. 87). 
Officer Belka of the Highway Patrol testified that 
around midnight on October 8, 1982, he was dispatched to the 
accident on I-15 exit at 3300 South. He talked with the 
defendant and asked for identification. Defendant had to get 
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identification, his wallet and drivers license, from inside the 
Blazer (T. 220, 221). Belka testified that defendant was 
staggering and had slurred speech. Belka further testified 
that defendant was disoriented and smelled of alcohol. He was 
also the driver identified by witnesses (T. 246). 
Officer Belka took defendant to St. Mark's Hospital 
where blood was drawn from defendant by Kay Fowler, a qualified 
R.N., who labeled the samples. Officer Belka had given his 
consent to draw blood at 1:18 a.m. (T. 272). 
William Stonebraker, Toxicologist for the Utah State 
Toxicology Department, testified that he performed the blood 
alcohol determination on the sample of blood drawn from 
defendant (T. 427). The method used for the test was the use 
of a gas chromatograph, an accepted and proper method for such 
determination. He received two results, .141 and .151 
percentage of alcohol per 100 cc (T. 435), both well above the 
Utah statutory standard of intoxication for driving under the 
influence. 
Dr. Brian Finkle testified as to the effects one 
encounters with various blood-alcohol levels and stated the 
driving impairments encountered at less than .141 as being 
substantial. He also testified that he personally would have 
run other tests on blood samples that varied as did those taken 
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by Stonebraker. He did not, however, testify that 
Stonebraker's tests were invalid (T. 482-487). 
Counsel for defendant objected to the admission of 
the blood test results. The motion was denied. Counsel for 
defendant moved for a directed verdict. This motion was also 
denied. A memorandum of law was filed (R. 023). The jury, 
weighing the evidence presented, found the defendant guilty as 
charged on poth counts. 
POINT I 
JURY INSTRUCTION NUMBER EIGHTEEN DID NOT PREJUDICE 
THE RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT AND IS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR 
Defendant speculates that the only way the jury could 
read instruction numbers 18 and 20 together would require them 
to not consider at all the Court's proper instruction on 
proximate cause. A.ll,_Q_f the jury instructions should be read 
together and in light of the total evidence before the jury, 
State y. Rubeo, 663 P.2d 445. 
Jury instruction number 18 reads: 
In the crimes of automobile homicide and driving 
under the iof lueoce of alcohol causing bodily 
injury it is no defense that any victim may also 
have been negligent in one or more respects and 
thereby also contributed to the cause of the 
accident. The test to be applied is whether 
you find from all facts that the defendant was 
negligent and that said negligence caused the 
death of Kelly Fehler and caused 
the injuries to Clinton Hepner. (Emphasis 
added.) 
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Instruction number 20 states: 
The proximate cause of an injury is that cause 
which, in natural and continuous sequence, 
(unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), 
produces the injury and without which the result 
would not have occurred. It is the efficient 
cause -- the one that necessarily sets in 
operation the factors that accomplish the 
injury. (Emphasis added.) 
Instruction number 18 is a simple restatement of the law on the 
defense of whether or not the victim was contributorily 
negligent. Instruction number 20 is a clear, simple statement 
on proximate cause often used in automobile homicide cases. 
These two do not conflict. Instruction number 21 sets forth: 
.l.f. you find that defendant was negligent and 
that the proximate cause of the alleged harm was 
an independent intervening act of a person not a 
party to this case, that the defendant in the 
exercise of ordinary care could not reasonably 
have anticipated as likely to happen, .t.h.e. 
defendant's original negligence is superseded by 
the intervening act and is not the proximate 
cause of the alleged harm. However, if in the 
exercise of ordinary care the defendant should 
reasonably have anticipated the intervening act, 
it does not supersede his original negligence or 
break the chain of proximate. 
As defendant points out, Mr. Hepner, though a victim 
per instruction 18, was not a party to this case per 
instruction 21. But defendant jumps to the conclusion that the 
two instructions pertaining to different classifications of 
persons cannot be read together without confusing the jury. 
This conclusion is just not supportable. While it is the 
standard, as set down by this Court in State v. Ruben, .IJi., 
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that jury instructions must be read as a connected whole, there 
is nothing evident in this case to indicate a breach of this 
standard. One instruction does not exclude the other. They 
are on different issues. The jury was still told to consider 
all of the facts. Clearly, the instructions are separate and 
contemplate two different classifications of persons and read 
as a whole under all the facts. Appellant creates his own 
confusion. 
Clearly the jury was instructed that the total "test 
to be applied" was whether or not they could find "from all of 
the facts" that the petitioner proximately caused the injuries, 
by "natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by efficient 
intervening causes." They were also told in instruction 
number 21 that .i!_ tlrey found that defendant was negligent and 
the proximate cause, that that "original negligence" could be 
superseded by an intervening act and, therefore, not be the 
proximate cause of the alleged harm. Although that was not the 
fact or the evidence before the jury, they were clearly given 
the opportunity to find in the appellant's favor. The 
appellant was clearly given the benefit of the doubt in the 
jury instructions and the opportunity to present truthful 
evidence. 
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POINT II 
APPELLANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED 
The California courts have held that it is 
permissible to give instructions that are in error, but which 
are not prejudicial error. People y. Butcher, 345 P,2d 127 
(Cal. 1959). Even if after reading the transcript, by some 
stretch of the imagination, the instructions might be 
confusing, that alleged confusion is not prejudicial error. 
There is no indication that the jury had difficulty with the 
instructions by requesting clarification. The jury was 
instructed on the case and apparently they found that the 
evidence was so conclusive that any alleged error did not 
influence the 
Appellant seems to contend that the jury instructions 
require that a defendant must be the only, or sole, proximate 
cause of death to be guilty of the proscribed conduct, Such a 
theory ignores the majority pcsition that recognizes the 
possibility of concurrent causes in homicide cases. If two 
intoxicated drivers were to negligently cause the death of an 
innocent third-party pedestrian, neither driver could be guilty 
of automobile homicide on appellant's theory. Both drivers (in 
the hypothetical) are equally negligent and direct causes of 
the pedestrian's death, yet neither driver is the sole proxi-
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mate cause. On appellant's theory, however, neither would be 
guilty although each would possess all of the characteristics 
necessary to be the proximate cause except the responsibility 
of being the sole proximate cause. 
Proximate cause in the criminal contexts may require 
a more direct causal link than is demanded of proximate cause 
for purposes of tort liability, see People y. Scott, 185 
N.W.2d 576 (Mich. 1971); State y. Newman, 513 P.2d 258 (Mont. 
1973). However, it need not be cause. The "tort 
contributory negligence" of a victim is not a proper 
consideration for criminal proximate cause issues, although the 
victim's actions may be considered to determine whether he is 
an intervening efficient cause. State y. Schaub, 44 N.W.2d 
61 (Minn. 1950). It,_ does not follow from either of these 
distinctions between tort and criminal law that criminal 
proximate cause requires the state to prove that the defendant 
was cause of the victim's death. 
This high Court made a similar decision on December 
13, 1983, Case No. 18708, State y. Hamblin, pointing out that 
the standard in this case and under the statute is simple 
negligence. The court rejected the appellant's assertion that 
a failure to instruct the jury on a superseding intervening 
cause was not even warranted by the evidence, said that the 
appellant was "clearly negligent in racing through a yellow 
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light at excessive speed." Justice Durham said that the other 
party's "negligence, if any, could only have been a concurrent 
cause and not a superseding one," and could not have insulated 
the appellant from criminal liability anyway. In that case the 
other party was the victim. Hamblin, l..d., page 4 (cites 
omitted). 
Going by the standards set forth in the Hamblin 
case and the other line of cases supportive of that decision, 
in this case, one need only look at how wide the two-lane exit 
was, the severity of the impact, and the exhibits shown to the 
jury, to determine that it was clear that the Datsun was off 
the side of the road and hit almost directly by the Blazer 
driven by the appellant. Exhibit 19, the picture of the front 
of the Blazer, a clear almost center impact upon the 
other vehicle. The other exhibits clearly show that the Datsun 
was hit directly in the rear end and at quite a force. See for 
example State's Exhibit 3. Exhibit 33, a picture of the actual 
marks on the highway, would clearly indicate the point of 
impact was off the side of the road and in the emergency lane. 
We submit that this Court should again find that "this 
assertion of confusion in the minds of the jury because of a 
possible conflict between jury instructions as to the possible 
negligence of the victim or any other party to be incredible." 
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Hamblin, .L;l. page 4. Appellant clearly and unprejudicially 
negligently caused the accident. 
POINT III 
THE BLOOD TEST WAS PROPER AND NOT PREJUDICIAL 
Mr. Stonebraker has testified that the blood test 
results were within the laboratory's standard, a standard 
prescribed to be followed in determining whether test results 
came within the error of tolerances. He further testified that 
when samples are taken from the specimen and run in duplicate 
and if a differentiation exists then the results must be within 
a differentiation of .Ol or less. Mr. Stonebraker testified 
that the test here involved was within the accepted laboratory 
standard. In applying the facts given by Mr. Stonebraker, Dr. 
Finkle applied his and testified that he would have 
rerun the test. There is nothing in Dr. Finkle's testimony 
indicating that even if rerun, the original test is invalid. 
Respondent contends that both the testimony of Mr. Stonebraker 
and Dr. Finkle are admissible evidence in this case. The 
testimony becomes a matter of fact for the jury to weigh. 
There is only a question of weight, not of admissibility. 
The test for admissibility of a blood test as 
evidence is whether the party offering the results of the test 
laid a proper foundation by producing an expert witness who can 
explain the test procedure and vouch for its correct 
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administration in a particular case. McCormick on Evidence 
§ 209 p. 513. Respondent contends that this standard was 
clearly met by Mr. Stonebraker's testimony and that any 
question as to the appropriateness of this testimony can go 
only to the weight given it. 
The evidence in the case clearly shows that there was 
sufficient evidence, besides the breath test, to find that 
the appellant was under the influence while driving at night. 
The circumstances of the accident alone and the point of impact 
on a clear, dry night alone would substantiate that. The 
standard of deviation on the test was still not sufficient to 
show, even giving it the benefit of all doubts, that there was 
not simple negligence. 
POINT IV 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED FOR THE JURY TO 
DETERMINE THAT APPELLANT WAS THE DRIVER OF SUBJECT VEHICLE 
Respondent believes that more than sufficient 
evidence was presented to establish by clear and convincing 
standard that defendant was driving the Blazer involved in the 
accident of concern in this case. While it is the law that a 
person shall not be convicted upon his own admission without 
independent evidence, that standard is surely met here. The 
Blazer was seen, while still rolling, with only one occupant in 
it. Several witnesses testified that the defendant was in the 
Blazer. Mr. Bringhurst identified the defendant as the person 
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he saw crawling out of the Blazer. Even though defendant 
contends there might have been other people in the Blazer, this 
is highly unlikely from the evidence. People came upon the 
scene immediately and they saw only the defendant in the 
Blazer. A thorough search of the area revealed no other 
people. There were no other drivers in the area with a cut on 
their chin, that the vehicle was registered to, who got their 
wallet out of the upside down Blazer with glass in it. No one 
else was pointed to by other witnessses. 
By the defendant's own implied admission, as gleaned 
from Sgt. Belka's testimony, defendant was operating the car 
(T. 296). Clearly the evidence as presented is sufficient to 
sustain a finding that defendant was the driver of the Blazer. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent in conclusion submits that the jury was 
not confused by the judge; that the petitioner/appellant was 
not, in any way, prejudiced; and the evidence and total 
circumstances of the case, along with the jury instructions, 
leaves no doubt that the case is similar to State v. Hamblin, 
.ll;l. There was obviously and clearly no intervening cause so 
that "a jury instruction on a superseding intervening cause 
would not have even been warranted by the evidence." As this 
Court said: 
The appellant also argues that the trial judge 
erred when he declined to instruct the jury that 
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1983. 
they must find Hamblin to be the 
proximate cause" of Stack's death before they 
could find Hamblin guilty. This argument is 
without merit. It is obvious that death may 
result from more than one cause. For example, a 
felon may shield himself from a pursuing officer 
with the body of an innocent bystander. If the 
officer, in an attempt to prevent the felon's 
escape, should shoot at the felon, but hit and 
kill the bystander, both the felon and the 
officer would be "causes" of the bystander's 
death. However, the felon would not be 
insulated from a conviction for homicide merely 
because he was not the cause of the 
bystander's death. This same logic holds true 
when applied to an instance of negligent 
conduct. 
The state, in a criminal case, is not 
required to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant's negligence 
was the proximate cause of the 
death. When a defendant negligently 
creates a risk of death to another 
person, the fact that the person 
actually died as a result of the 
combination of that negligence plus 
some -other contributing factor does 
not serve to exculpate. 
Hamblin, .IJi, page 3 (citations omitted). 
Respectfully submitted day of December, 
-- ---:;? 
BRUCE M. HALE 
Assistant Attorney General 
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